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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
JAIME M. LONGORIA, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
vs. 
OREM CITY, 
Plaintiff/Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 20070218-CA 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Longoria was charged by Orem City with Reckless Driving and 
Driving Under the Influence, both class B misdemeanors. R. 5. The case was filed 
and prosecuted in the Fourth Judicial District Court before Judge John C. 
Backlund. R. 7-8. Mr. Longoria went to trial with original counsel and was 
convicted of both counts over prior counsel's objections to two jury instructions 
given by the trial court. R. 29-28. (See Factual section below.) 
New counsel, counsel herein, filed a Motion for a New Trial based on two 
jury instructions complained of by Mr. Longoria. R. 113-89. The City objected to 
the new trial. R. 136-126. The trial court granted the Motion for New Trial as to 
the DUI count only. R. 144-142; R. 149-145 (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law). 
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Counsel objected urging the court to vacate the Reckless Driving 
Conviction, as well, citing Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. R. 156-
153. The City opposed the Motion and the trial court denied the Motion. R 162-
158; R. 175. 
Counsel then filed a Motion urging the trial court to dismiss the DUI count 
on double jeopardy grounds and Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-403, Former prosecution 
barring subsequent prosecution for offense out of same episode. R. 185-178. The 
City again objected, and the Court denied the Motion to dismiss the DUI count but 
reversed its original order on the first motion and ordered Mr. Longoria returned to 
the original pre-trial position on both counts; a new trial was scheduled. R. 196-
193; R. 201-02. 
At the new trial on both counts the court prepared new jury instructions 
replacing the two which had been the subject of granting the new trial. T. 3-10. 
See Addendum A. Counsel objected to the new instructions, urging that while the 
offending language had been removed, the court's instructions lacked the 
necessary language to assure a fair jury trial and verdict. T. 3-8. The court 
overruled the objections and the case proceeded to trial. T. 7-8. Mr. Longoria 
again was convicted on both counts. R. 236-37. 
Mr. Longoria was sentenced on both counts including a jail term of four 
days and a number of other conditions. R. 247-246. He requested a Certificate of 
Probable Cause which the court denied. R. 258-256; R. 260. This appeal 
followed. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Two jury instructions given by the court in the original trial contained 
language instructing the jury that under the law the refusal to submit to field 
sobriety tests (first trial instruction no. 10—see Addendum C), and the refusal to 
submit to a chemical breath test (first trial instruction no. 13—see Addendum D), 
both indicated the Defendant's consciousness of guilt. On the Motion for New 
Trial Mr. Longoria complained that the instructions had compromised a fair jury 
verdict because (1) of the presence of he consciousness of guilt language creating 
a presumption of guilt thereby shifting the burden of proof to the Defendant, and 
(2) the lack of language elucidating that the refusal to submit to field sobriety tests 
and a chemical test may be choices consistent with innocence. 
The Motion for a New Trial eventually was granted over the City's 
objection (as explained in the Statement of the Case) and the trial court prepared 
and gave new instructions to the jury. T. 1-10. The new instructions drafted by 
the court for the second trial, now numbered instructions 8 and 9, removed "the 
consciousness of guilt" language, but did not include the requested language that 
the jury was permitted to find that the reasons for a refusal of both field sobriety 
tests and a requested chemical test may be supported by reasons consistent with 
innocence. Id. Mr. Longoria objected to the two replacement instructions, as he 
had in the Motion for a New Trial, urging here that despite the court's removal of 
the offending "consciousness of guilt" language, the instructions lacked the critical 
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language, and more essential language, which permitted the jury to consider that 
the refusals may be supported by reasons completely consistent with innocence. 
T. 4-7. 
In fact, counsel had submitted replacement instructions for both the field 
sobriety tests refusals and the chemical test refusals which the court refused to 
give, noted the objection, stated they would not be given and indicated the 
instructions would be endorsed as rejected and made part of the record. T. 5-8. 
Notably, the court did comment to counsel that even counsel's proffered 
instruction maintained the "consciousness of guilt" language which the court 
claimed was the basis of the new trial and not the "reasons consistent with 
innocence" language. T. 5. Counsel disagreed and asked for a record to be made 
of his objection. T. 5-7. 
The record of the Defense Motion for a New Trial demonstrates that 
counsel complained of the consciousness of guilt language and proffered the Utah 
Supreme Court's language from State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573 (Utah 1983), noting 
the important inclusion of language indicating that there may be reasons for 
refusing to submit to filed sobriety tests or a chemical test fully consistent with 
innocence and that even if consciousness of guilt is inferred from flight it does not 
necessarily reflect actual guilt of the crime charged. R. 105-103. 
The trial court's Conclusions of Law signed by the Court, and un-objected 
to by the City, likewise support that the granting of the new trial for both reasons: 
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3. Jury Instructions 10 & 13 were improper based on their lack of 
language advising the jury that there may be reasons for refusing the field 
sobriety tests or chemical tests fully consistent with innocence and that 
even if consciousness of guilt is inferred from the Defendant's refusal to 
submit to field sobriety test [or] his refusal to submit to a chemical test, 
such evidence does not reflect actual guilt of the crime charged. 
R. 148. 
The instructions drafted and given to the jury by the courting the second 
trial, numbers 8 and 9, did not contain consciousness of guilt language but they 
also lacked the "there may be reasons for refusing the field sobriety tests or 
chemical tests fully consistent with innocence" language. Instructions 8 and 9 are 
provided in Addenda E and F, respectively. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
After granting Mr. Longoria a new trial due to improper jury instruction 
which impermissibly shifted the burden to the Defendant to prove his innocence, 
the trial court only partially repaired the flawed instructions. The given 
instructions during the second trial failed to instruct the jury that the choices of 
Mr. Longoria to refuse field sobriety tests and the chemical test may have been 
based on reason consistent with innocence. Without that language, the instruction 
remained violative of his due process rights and rights to a fair trial by an impartial 
jury. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPROPRIATELY INSTRUCT 
THE JURY THAT REFUSALS TO DO FIELD SOBRIETY TESTS 
AND A CHEMICAL TEST MAY BE SUPPORTED BY REASONS 
COMPLETELY CONSISTENT WITH INNOCENCE. 
In order to convict a Defendant of Driving Under the Influence the 
prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant had a blood 
alcohol content of .08 or greater as shown by a chemical test or that the Defendant 
was under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of alcohol and drugs 
to a degree that rendered him incapable of safely operating a motor vehicle. Utah 
Code Ann. § 41-6-502. In the present case, due to the fact that there was not an 
admissible chemical test, the City conceded that the only theory under which the 
Defendant could be convicted of DUI was that the Defendant had operated a 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or drugs or combination thereof, to 
such a degree that the Defendant could not safely drive a vehicle. (See Jury 
Instruction # 5, R. 231.) 
The Jury Instructions at issue here involve the Defendant's refusal to 
perform requested field sobriety tests and his refusal to submit to a chemical test. 
Specifically, the issue before this Court focuses on the trial court's instructions to 
the jury regarding the manner in which the jury should consider evidence of the 
two refusals. 
Mr. Longoria sought and received a new trial due to the trial courts 
incorrect jury instructions during the first trial. At the second trial, Mr. Longoria 
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contends that the court again erred in instructing the jury, particularly by giving 
jury instructions number 8 and number 9 over his objection. Addenda and 
. The improper jury instructions given by the court permitted a shift in the 
burden of proof to the Defendant and resulted in substantial adverse effects on the 
rights of the defendant to due process of law, a fair jury trial, and ultimately a fair 
verdict entered by a properly instructed jury based on the appropriate law. Mr. 
Longoria insists that had appropriate instructions been given, the jury would likely 
have reached a different verdict. 
Refusal to Submit to Field Sobriety Tests 
It is undisputed that Mr. Longoria did not perform field sobriety tests in this 
case. However, what is disputed is whether the Court properly instructed the jury 
on whether and how they can consider evidence that the Defendant did not 
perform the field sobriety tests as requested by the officer. The instruction given 
in the first trial read as follows: 
Instruction #10 [first trial] 
REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TO FIELD SOBRIETY TEST. You are 
instructed that under the law the refusal to submit to a field sobriety tests is 
best described as conduct indicating a consciousness of guilt. 
R.46. 
After motions and argument by counsel, the trial court recognized the 
prejudicial error contained in this instruction and granted a new trial. In that new 
trial the court drafted and gave this instruction in place of the above instruction. 
7 
Instruction No. 9 [the new trial] 
The Defendant is not required, by law, to submit to the officer's request to 
perform field sobriety tests; however, you may take notice of and give 
whatever weight you determine to the fact that the defendant refused to 
perform any field sobriety tests. 
R. 227. Absent from the instruction is language permitting the jury to find reasons 
consistent with innocence as the basis for the refusals. 
Under Utah law it is neither a criminal offense nor otherwise unlawful to 
refuse to perform field sobriety tests. Most traffic stops involving suspected drunk 
drivers likely result in the arresting officer requesting that the driver perform field 
sobriety tests; however, there is no legal or statutory obligation requiring that a 
driver submit to field sobriety tests. Similarly, neither is there any requirement 
that a police officer require an arrested person to perform field sobriety tests 
before arresting a driver for DUI. In fact, in many cases the arresting officer does 
not request that the driver submit to field sobriety tests before placing the driver 
under arrest for a DUI. In those cases the absence of field sobriety tests certainly 
does not prevent the driver from being arrested or prosecuted. Field sobriety tests 
are simply a tool which an officer can use at his or her discretion to gather 
evidence in investigating a suspected drunk driving offense. 
Refusal to Submit to Chemical Test 
It is also undisputed that Mr. Longoria did not submit to a chemical test to 
determine the blood alcohol content of his breath or blood. However what is 
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disputed is whether the Court properly instructed the jury on whether and how 
they can consider evidence that the Defendant refused to submit to a chemical test 
as requested by the officer. Again, in the first trial the court instructed as follows: 
Instruction No. 13 [first trial] 
REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TO BREATH TEST. You are instructed that 
under the law the refusal of a person to submit to a chemical breath test is 
best described as conduct indicating a consciousness of guilt. 
R. 43. The replacement instruction was give as follows: 
Instruction No. 8 [the new trial] 
You are instructed that under Utah law a person operating a motor 
vehicle in this State is considered to have given consent to a chemical test 
or tests of his breath, blood or urine for the purpose of determining whether 
he/she was operating or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle while 
under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or a combination thereof. 
When an officer arrests a person for Driving Under the Influence of 
Alcohol and/or Drugs, the officer may request the person to submit to a test 
of his breath, blood or urine to determine the person's blood or breath 
alcohol level. 
You may take notice of and give whatever weight you determine to 
the Defendant's refusal to submit to the blood or breath test requested by 
the officer, just as you may weigh and consider any evidence presented to 
you. 
R. 228. 
Under Utah law it is not a crime to refuse to submit to a chemical test; 
however, pursuant to Utah's Implied Consent Law, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-520, 
a driver who refuses to submit to chemical test may suffer a suspension of his 
driving privileges for a period of 18 to 24 months and may be restricted from 
operating a vehicle with any amount of alcohol in his system for 5 to 10 years. 
Furthermore, although Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-524 states that "If a person under 
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arrest refuses to submit to a chemical test or tests or any additional test under 
Section 41-6a-520, evidence of any refusal is admissible in any civil or criminal 
action or proceedings" resulting from the arrest for DUI, the statute contains no 
language regarding a presumption of guilt or a presumption that the defendant's 
refusal is evidence of a consciousness of guilt. 
ANALYSIS 
Both new instructions, as noted, removed the "consciousness of guilt" 
language but erroneously failed to clarify that there may be innocent reasons why 
a Defendant might refuse field sobriety tests and/or a chemical test. The 
importance of this missing language is apparent in other jury instruction decisions. 
In State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court was 
asked to rule on the propriety of a flight instruction analogous to our situation 
here. The instruction at issue in Bales read as follows: 
The flight or attempted flight of a person immediately after the 
commission of a crime or after he is accused of a crime that has been 
committed, is not sufficient in itself to establish his guilt, but is a fact 
which, if proven, may be considered by you in the light of all other proven 
facts in deciding the question of his guilt or innocence. The weight to 
which such circumstance is entitled is a matter for the jury to determine. 
You are further instructed that flight affords a basis for an inference of 
consciousness of guilt and constitutes an implied admission. 
State v. Bales. 675 P.2d 573, 574 (Utah 1983). 
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Although the Utah Supreme Court found that the first paragraph of this 
instruction was acceptable, the Court found that the language of the second 
paragraph to be improper. The Court opined: 
We are also persuaded that the first paragraph of the flight instruction 
given in this case was acceptable in view of the evidence. It should, 
however, have incorporated two further ideas. A flight instruction will not 
be completely free from criticism unless it advises the jury that there may 
be reasons for flight fully consistent with innocence and that even if 
consciousness of guilt is inferred from flight it does not necessarily reflect 
actual guilt of the crime charged. 
In contrast, we can find no justification for the second paragraph of the 
flight instruction given to the jury in this case. Indeed, the State does not 
even attempt to justify it. So far as we have been able to determine, the 
idea that flight constitutes an "implied admission" of guilt is not supported 
by any federal or state decision or by any of the analysis justifying flight 
instructions. 
Id. at 575-76 (emphasis added). 
Likewise, in State v.Robichaux, 639 P.2d 207 (Utah 198Inciting 
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979)), the Court reversed a conviction and 
explained that instructions capable of interpretation by the jury as being 
mandatory or conclusive are violative of the burden of proof standard and the 
presumption of innocence. The irregularity in the instruction used in Robichaux 
warranting reversal was that the instruction there assisted the jury to find as a 
matter of law that the intent element had been established which impermissibly 
shifted the burden to the defendant. Id. at 210. 
This Court has also reviewed burden shifting instructions. In State v. 
Howland. 761 P.2d 579 (Utah App 1988), this Court reversed a conviction in a 
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flight instruction case where the flight occurred before the commission of the 
crime. This Court noted: 
Even if the evidence had supported the giving of this flight instruction, the 
trial judge should also have advised the jury that (1) there may be reasons 
for flight fully consistent with innocence, and (2) even if consciousness of 
guilt is inferred from flight it does not necessarily reflect actual guilt of the 
crime charged. 
Id. at 580 n. 1 (citing Bales, 675 P.2d at 575). 
Although the language of the instruction at issue in Bales and the language 
used in the instructions in this case are not identical, the language that "under the 
law" and a failure to clarify that reasons for the refusals may be consistent with 
innocence have the same affect as the "implied admission" the Utah Supreme 
Court found improper in Bales. A reasonable juror could certainly interpret the 
language utilized by the court to mean that if they find that the Defendant refused 
to submit to field sobriety tests or refused to submit to a chemical test, that his 
refusals must be regarded as a presumption or an admission of guilt. 
While the trial court eliminated part of the problems with the first trial's 
jury instructions (consciousness of guilt), the second, (that there may be reasons 
for refusing to submit to filed sobriety tests or a chemical test fully consistent with 
innocence), and perhaps more important aspect of the offending instructions, was 
not repaired. The replacement instructions, without the language, shifted the 
burden to the Mr. Longoria by directing the jury that under the law the 
Defendant's refusals were evidence of guilt. 
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CONCLUSION 
As the court is aware an admission of guilt by a Defendant is one of the 
most compelling pieces of evidence that can be introduced in a criminal case. 
Likewise, an implied admission of guilt has a similar affect. The prosecution's 
case focused around the Mr. Longoria's refusal to perform field sobriety tests and 
his refusal to submit to a chemical test and the presumption that these refusals 
established his guilt. As such, the impact of the improper jury instructions had on 
this case was substantial; and absent these improper instructions, the jury's verdict 
would have been different. 
Mr. Longoria's due process rights and his right to have a fair and impartial 
jury trial were denied when the court erred by giving the improper jury 
instructions numbers 8 and 9. 
THEREFORE, the Mr. Longoria respectfully requests that this Court find 
that at the second trial in this matter there was an error or impropriety which had a 
substantial adverse effect upon his rights to due process and a fair and impartial 
jury trial meriting the convictions be reversed and a decision entered granting a 
new trial in this matter. 
DATED thisQ_ day of October, 2007. 
JASON SCHATZ 
Attorney for Appellant 
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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S 
(December 18, 2006 - Partial Transcript) 
THE JUDGE: The first instruction is the basic 
stock instruction, introductory instruction. 
Number two defines evidence, direct and 
circumstantial. 
Number three speaks about statements and arguments 
by, made by the attorneys, offers of evidence. It's pretty 
much stock. 
Number four is the credibility instruction. 
Number five is the elements instruction for driving 
under the influence and instructs them if they don't find all 
of the elements they must find the defendant not guilty, and 
if they do beyond a reasonable doubt they must find the 
defendant guilty. 
Number six says not every person that's consume an 
alcoholic beverage and then drives a vehicle is guilty of 
driving under the influence of alcohol to a degree to such 
person is rendered incapable of safely driving a vehicle. 
On the other hand, it is not necessary that a person be 
intoxicated or, to be under the influence. And then it 
defines what that means to be impaired. 
The next one says under the influence, covers not 
only the well-known and easily recognized conditions and 
degrees of intoxication but covers any perceptible abnormal 
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mental or physical condition. And then it says the city is 
not bound to prove the defendant was drunk or intoxicated but 
was driving under the influence, the person had consumed 
alcohol to a degree that rendered him incapable of safely 
driving a vehicle. 
The next one talks about the chemical tests. You 
are instructed under Utah law a person operating a motor 
vehicle in this state is considered to have given consent to 
a chemical test or test of his breath, blood or urine for 
purposes of determining whether he or she was operating or in 
actual physical control of a motor vehicle under the 
influence of alcohol, any drug or combination thereof. 
When an officer arrests a person for driving under 
the influence of alcohol and/or drugs the officer may request 
the person to submit to a test of his breath, blood or urine 
to determine the person's blood or alcohol, breath alcohol 
level. 
You may take notice of and give whatever weight 
you determine to the defendant's refusal to submit to the 
blood or breath test requested by the officer, just as you 
may weigh and consider any evidence presented to you. 
So it's neither one of your instructions, it's one 
I had drafted. 
MR. SCHATZ: Your Honor, I find that to be flawed 
and the reason it is is because it doesn't include the 
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language about other reasons for refusal that are also 
consistent with innocence. That, that was one of the things 
that obviously we argued about. And all of the jury 
instructions cases that I've found dealing with flight and so 
on required that explanation that there may also be reasons 
that are completely consistent with innocence. I mean, that 
specific language is what the whole motion for a new trial 
was all about. 
THE JUDGE: No. Your motion really went to that 
refusal to submit to the chemical test shows a consciousness 
of guilt. That was your big objection. 
MR. SCHATZ: Best characterized— 
THE JUDGE: Was best characterized as a 
consciousness of guilt s o — 
MR. SCHATZ: NO. 
THE JUDGE: So that, in fact that's in your 
proffer instruction, consciousness of guilt, and I've 
eliminated that entirely. 
What other reason besides asserting his 
constitutional right against self-incrimination would this 
defendant have for not submitting to the test, or in the 
alternative that he didn't want them to know what his blood 
or breath alcohol content level was? 
MR. SCHATZ: I would just like the record to 
note, I mean, certainly the court is going to decide whether 
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or not that's going to be included, but I would like the 
record to note that I do object to the instruction if it 
doesn't contain that specific statement regarding, you know, 
that can be consistent with innocence. I think that specific 
language was included in, in why we granted the motion for 
a new trial, and all of the case law that I provided. So 
I just want it noted on the record that if it's not 
included— 
THE JUDGE: I, I thought the a, argument for the 
new trial was the consciousness of guilt thing, not that 
there are other reasons consistent with innocence to not take 
the chemical test. For the life of me I can't figure out 
what they would be. 
MR. SCHATZ: Well, I think that's— 
THE JUDGE: What would be consistent with 
innocence in not taking— 
MR. SCHATZ: Exercising your rights, being upset 
with the officer, I mean, I think— 
THE JUDGE: Being upset with the officer is 
consistent with innocence? 
MR. SCHATZ: Sure. I mean I guess my, m y — 
THE JUDGE: I guess it's a reason. I don't think 
it's consistent with innocence or guilt. It's not 
consistent with anything. 
MR. SCHATZ: My objection, Your Honor, just so 
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it's noted on the record— 
THE JUDGE: Right. 
MR. SCHATZ: — is with the language— 
THE JUDGE: Okay. 
MR. SCHATZ: — specifically that it doesn't 
contain that because I think it has to. 
THE JUDGE: Thank you. The next instruction says 
the defendant is not required by law to submit to the 
officer's request to perform field sobriety tests, however, 
you may take notice of and give whatever weight you determine 
to the fact that the defendant refused to perform any field 
sobriety tests. 
MR. SCHATZ: Your Honor, and for the benefit of 
the record I have the same objection. I've submitted an 
instruction that also includes the innocence language that I 
think would be appropriate for an instruction such as this. 
So if the court could just make sure that the record notes 
that I object to this instruction and have submitted what I 
believe to be an appropriate instruction including the 
innocence language as well. 
THE JUDGE: All right. 
MR. SCHATZ: I don't know if we can mark these to 
be put in the file specifically as the ones I submitted. 
THE JUDGE: Yes. You can, you can write on there 
objected to, not given. I have to endorse on each one of 
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these why I gave it over your objection. So we'll make a 
record of that. 
You know, we could actually print something as long 
as the bible to read to this jury on the instructions, and it 
could be 50 or 60 pages if we go over every possible 
scenario. I don't think that's necessary. I think the 
jury needs a straightforward statement of the law. It says 
to the jury that he's not required by law to submit to the 
officer's request to perform the field sobriety tests. His 
stated reason to Officer Laney was I don't have to take 
those. So I think that's consistent. He says I'm not 
required by the law to take your field sobriety tests and 
I'm not going to. And I tell the jury in the instruction 
that he isn't required by law to admit to that, but they can 
consider that. So okay. I guess we choose to disagree on 
that. 
The next instruction is the offense of reckless 
driving containing the a, the elements of that. And so is 
the city, I'm trying to understand— 
MR. PETERSON: Yes. 
THE JUDGE: You don't include within this that he, 
all you're going on is that it was three or more moving 
violations within a single continuous act, period of 
driving? So you're not alleging that he drove in willful and 
wanton disregard? 
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MR. PETERSON: No. For strategic reasons I think 
it's just simpler t o — 
THE JUDGE: All right. 
MR. PETERSON: — stick with (short inaudible, 
no mic). 
THE JUDGE: All right. So that's, and then so 
I'11 take out the next one that says willful and wanton 
disregard since that doesn't apply. And I'll take out the 
next one that talks about a definition of willful disregard 
since that doesn't apply. And then we need to remove a 
person acts willfully. 
So the next instruction a, is the elements 
instruction, I suppose, for speeding which is a component of 
the three or more moving violations. 
And then the one after that is the, the component 
of failure to stop for a stop sign. 
And the one following that is failure to maintain a 
single lane of travel. 
All right. Then we come to the instruction after 
that which depends on whether or not Mr. Longoria is going to 
testify. So I can either give an instruction that he's not 
going to testify, I've got one here. If he is going to 
testify the competent witness in his own on behalf 
instruction, s o — 
MR. SCHATZ: And, Your Honor, I think we need a 
COURT PROCEEDINGS 
PAGE 9 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
1 1 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
few more minutes to discuss that before we make a final 
determination. 
THE JUDGE: Okay. And then we have the 
reasonable doubt instruction. 
The court has not intended by anything which it has 
said or done. 
Jury consult with one another, blank form of 
verdict, and then the two verdict forms. 
So other than those two instructions do you have 
any objections about them? Or any other requests? Except 
for whether he testifies or not. 
Do you want to go... Would you make two copies of 
that please so that we're, we can go either way. 
All right. Well, we'll take a recess. The jury 
is eating their dinner so that'll take, you know, maybe 10 
more minutes. And then I'll come in before we bring the 
jury in to find out if Mr. Longoria is going to testify or 
not. 
MR. SCHATZ: Thank you, Your Honor. 
THE JUDGE: Thank you. 
(Recording turned off) 
WHEREUPON, the portion of the hearing requested 
transcribed was concluded. 
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STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF UTAH 
REPORTER'S CERTIFICATION 
) SS 
I, Penny C. Abbott, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and 
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, do hereby certify 
that I received the electronically recorded CD #57 in the 
matter of Orem City vs. Longoria, hearing date December 18, 
2006, and that I transcribed it into typewriting and that a 
full, true and correct transcription of said hearing so 
recorded and transcribed is set forth in the foregoing pages 
numbered 1 through 10, inclusive except where it is indicated 
that the tape recording was inaudible. 
WITNESS my hand and official seal this 14th day of June, 
2007 _ 
1 
-Z/4L4U, dOM^JJ 
PENNY C. ABBOTT, COURT REPORTER/NOTARY 
License ^ 2-^ —1 0281 1—7 801 
Notary Public, Comm Exp 9-24-08 
/ ^ \ PENNY C ABBOTT 
fzf'/lB&tfVi NOTARY PUBLIC • STATE of UTAH 
\%\ «*j&jr,!S 1817 E 800 S 
feWj^y SALEM UT 84653 
<SSSy COMM. EXP. 09/24/2008 
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ADDENDUM B 
Jason Schatz (Bar #9969) 
Schatz & Anderson, LLC 
Attorneys for Defendant 
356 E. 900 S. 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Phone (801) 746-0447 
Fax (801) 579-0606 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT, 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
OREM CITY, : FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW AND ORDER GRANTING 
Plaintiff, : DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
NEW TRIAL 
v. : 
JAIME LONGORIA, : CASE # 055210298 
Defendant. : JUDGE BACKLUND 
The above entitled matter came before this court for hearing on the Defendant's Motion 
for New Trial on May 10, 2006. The Plaintiff, Orem City, was present and represented by Orem 
City Attorney, Mike Barker. The Defendant was present and represented by his attorne>. Jason 
Schatz. 
In his Motion for New Trial, the Defendant moved the court to grant a new trial in this 
matter on the grounds that the jury was provided with improper instructions regarding the 
Defendant's refusal to submit to field sobriety tests and refusal to submit to a chemical test. IN 
particular, the Defendant challenged the propriety of Jury Instructions 10 & 13 as provide to the 
jury on the day of trial. 
FILED 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
00149 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
After having reviewed the documents and exhibits and hearing argument from counsel 
for both parties, the court finds that: 
1. The Defendant raised proper objections to Jury Instructions 10 & 13 at the time fo 
trial. 
2. The Defendant refused to submit to field sobriety tests prior to his arrest and he 
refused to submit to a chemical test after his arrest. The jury was given 
instructions 10 & 13 regarding the defendant's refusal to submit to field sobriety 
tests and his refusal to submit to a chemical test, over defense counsel's objection. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based on the Court's Findings of Fact the court hereby makes the following 
Conclusions of Law: 
1. In light of the rulings of the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Bales, 675 P.2d 573 
(Utah 1983) and State v. Robichaux, 639 P.2d 207(Utah 1981), the Utah Court of 
Appeals in State v. Riggs, 987 P.2d 1281(Utah App.,1999) as well as the United States 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Newhouse v. Misterly, 415 F.2d 514, 
(C.A.Cal, 1969), Jury Instructions 10 & 13 as provided to the jury in this case were not 
proper instruction under Utah law. 
2 
00148 
2. Jury Instructions 10 & 13 created an improper presumption of guilt based on the 
Defendant's refusal to submit to field sobriety tests and the refusal to submit to a 
chemical test. 
3. Jury Instructions 10 & 13 were improper based on their lack of language advising 
the jury that there may be reasons for refusing the filed sobriety tests or chemical tests 
fully consistent with innocence and that even if consciousness of guilt is inferred from the 
Defendant's refusal to submit to filed sobriety test of his refusal to submit to a chemical 
test, such evidence does not reflect actual guilt of the crime charged. 
4. The Court's failure to properly instruct the jury had a prejudicial affect on the 
Defendant's right to a fair and impartial jury trial. Absent the improper jury instructions 
the jury's verdict with regard to the charge of DUI may likely have resulted in a verdict 
more favorable to the Defendant. 
ORDER 
THEREFORE after having fully considered the caselaw and arguments presented by both 
parties, and based on the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law set forth above, IT IS 
HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant's Motion for New trial is granted with regard to Count 
1, Driving Under the Influence. As such, the Defendant's conviction and sentence on Count 1, 
Driving Under the Influence is hereby vacated and this matter is set for a new trial on Count 1 
00147 
only. The Defendant's conviction on Count 2, Reckless Driving stands as well as the sentence 
imposed on Count 2, Reckless Driving. 
DATED this /? day of. 
Approved as to form: 
/ * * * 
., 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDGE/BACKLUND 
Fourtn District Court (A 
MIKE BARKER 
OREM CITY ATTORNEY 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on this day, May 16, 2006,1 personally mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order Granting Motion for New Trial to the 
following: 
Judge Backlund 
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT 
97 E. Center St. 
Orem, UT 84057 
Mike Barker 
OREM CITY ATTORNEY 
56 N. State St. 
Orem, UT 84057 
Jaime Longoria 
68 E. 200 N., Apt. # 2 
Salt Lake City, UT 84103 
/ 
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ADDENDUM C 
INSTRUCTION NO. \0 
REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TO FIELD SOBRIETY TEST. You are instructed that under 
the law the refusal of a person to submit to a field sobriety tests is best described as conduct 
indicating a consciousness of guilt. 
00046 
ADDENDUM D 
INSTRUCTION NO. ) 3 
REFUSAL TO SUBMIT TO BREATH TEST. You are instructed that under the law the 
refusal of a person to submit to a chemical breath test is best described as conduct indicating a 
consciousness of guilt. 
00043 
ADDENDUM E 
INSTRUCTION NO. _^ 
You are instructed that under Utah law a person operating a motor vehicle in this State is 
considered to have given consent to a chemical test or tests of his breath, blood, or urine for the 
purpose of determining whether he/she was operating or in actual physical control of a motor 
vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or a combination thereof. 
When an officer arrests a person for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or 
Drugs, the officer may request the person to submit to a test of his breath, blood or urine to 
determine the person's blood or breath alcohol level. 
You may take notice of and give whatever weight you determine to the Defendant's 
refusal to submit to the blood or breath test requested by the officer, just as you may weigh and 
consider any evidence presented to you. 
00228 
ADDENDUM F 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
The Defendant is not required, by law, to submit to the officer's request to perform field 
sobriety tests; however, you may take notice of and give whatever weight you determine to the 
fact that the defendant refused to perform any field sobriety tests. 
00227 
